| Claim | Source | URL | Supporting line or locator |
|---|
| ---|---|---|--- |
| Pruitt-Igoe was built under the Housing Act of 1949 | BRISTOL | see above | p. 163: "Pruitt-Igoe was created under the United States Housing Act of 1949, which made funds directly available to cities for slum clearance, urban redevelopment, and public housing." |
| In 1950 St. Louis got a federal commitment for 5,800 public housing units; about half went to Pruitt-Igoe | BRISTOL | same | p. 164: "In 1950 St. Louis received a federal commitment for 5800 public housing units, about half of which were allocated by the St. Louis Housing Authority to Pruitt-Igoe." |
| Site: 57 acres on the north side, in the DeSoto-Carr neighborhood, cleared under the postwar redevelopment plan | BRISTOL; TCLF; RAIN-1967 | see above | BRISTOL p. 164: "Located on a 57-acre site on the north side black ghetto, it was one of several tracts that had been targeted for slum clearance"; TCLF: "The 57-acre Pruitt-Igoe complex, located in the DeSoto-Carr neighborhood"; RAIN-1967 p. 116: "one 57-acre tract" |
| Before Pruitt-Igoe, the 1947 city plan proposed two- or three-story row apartments and a park for DeSoto-Carr; Mayor Joseph Darst, elected 1949, favored high-rise projects | VONH | see above | "The commission proposed clearing the area and constructing 'two- or three-story row type apartment buildings' and a large public park. The election of Joseph Darst as mayor transformed these plans." Darst "greatly admired the new high-rise public housing projects" in New York |
| The plan was 33 identical eleven-story buildings | BRISTOL; RAIN-1967; VONH; HUD-EDGE | see above | BRISTOL p. 164: "a scheme using 33 identical eleven-story elevator buildings"; RAIN-1967 p. 116: "33 eleven-story slab-shaped buildings"; HUD-EDGE: "3 of the project's 33 towers" |
| Unit count: from about 2,700 to 2,870, by source | BRISTOL; RAIN-1967; NEWMAN-1996; VONH; TCLF | see above | BRISTOL p. 164: "The 2700-unit project would house 15,000 tenants"; RAIN-1967 p. 116: "designed to provide housing for about 2800 families"; NEWMAN-1996 p. 9: "2,740-unit public housing highrise development"; VONH: "contained 2,870 dwelling units in 33 eleven-story buildings"; TCLF: "nearly 3,000 residential units". WP gives 2,870 (1,736 Pruitt, 1,132 Igoe) citing St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 9, 1956 |
| Planned population: 15,000 tenants (Bristol); about 10,000 people in 2,000 households in 1967 | BRISTOL; RAIN-1967 | see above | BRISTOL p. 164 as above; RAIN-1967 p. 116: "At present, it houses about 10,000 Negroes in 2,000 households" (1967 wording) |
| Density was set higher than the slum it replaced, to house people displaced by other clearance | BRISTOL | see above | p. 164: "at densities higher than the original slum dwellings. The high density resulted from housing and redevelopment officials' expectations that these projects would eventually come to house not only those displaced by slum clearance for Pruitt-Igoe, but also by demolition for redevelopment projects" |
| Architects: Leinweber, Yamasaki & Hellmuth, commissioned in 1950; Minoru Yamasaki led the design | BRISTOL; TCLF | see above | BRISTOL p. 164: "In 1950 the St. Louis Housing Authority commissioned the firm of Leinweber, Yamasaki & Hellmuth to design Pruitt-Igoe"; TCLF: "designed by Minoru Yamasaki of the St. Louis-based firm Leinweber, Yamasaki, & Hellmuth" |
| The architects' first proposal mixed high-rise, mid-rise and walk-up buildings; it exceeded the federal cost limit per unit, and a Public Housing Administration field officer insisted on the uniform scheme | BRISTOL | see above | p. 164: "Their first design proposals called for a mixture of high-rise, mid-rise, and walk-up structures. Though this arrangement was acceptable to the local authority, it exceeded the federal goverment's maximum allowable cost per unit. At this point a field officer of the federal Public Housing Administration (P.H.A.) intervened and insisted on a scheme using 33 identical eleven-story elevator buildings" (citing Meehan 1979 p. 71) |
| Counterview: PHA cost limits did not force the scale; contractor bids ran St. Louis costs 60 percent above the national average, and the city responded by raising density, shrinking rooms and removing amenities | VONH | see above | "Nor is there any truth in claims that PHA cost limits forced the authority to increase the project's scale. On the contrary, building contractors inflated their bids to the point that public-housing construction costs in St. Louis were 60 percent above the national average. When the PHA would not raise its unit cost ceilings to accommodate the contractor bids, the city responded by raising densities, reducing room sizes, and removing amenities." |
| Site and size, number of units and density were set by the housing authority before the architects began | BRISTOL | see above | p. 164: "The architects' task was constrained by the size and location of the site, the number of units, and the project density, all of which had been predetermined by the St. Louis Housing Authority." |
| Cost cutting removed children's play areas, landscaping and ground-floor bathrooms, and cheapened hardware | BRISTOL (citing Meehan) | see above | p. 165: "In addition to the elimination of amenities, such as children's play areas, landscaping, and ground-floor bathrooms, the cost cutting targeted points of contact between the tenants and the living units." |
| The planned landscape was cut to sparse trees, a baseball field and scattered play equipment | TCLF | see above | "The rich formal landscaping planned for the campus ... was omitted through budget cuts in favor of sparse deciduous tree plantings, a baseball field, and scattered playground elements." |
| A "river of trees" was meant to flow under the buildings | NEWMAN-1996 | see above | p. 10: "'A river of trees' was to flow under the buildings." |
| Design features: skip-stop elevators and glazed galleries on every third floor, meant as "vertical neighborhoods," with laundry and storage off the galleries | BRISTOL | see above | p. 165: "skip-stop elevators and glazed internal galleries ... intended to create 'individual neighborhoods' within each building. The galleries, located on every third floor ... Laundry and storage rooms also opened off the galleries." |
| Construction cost about $36 million | WP citing Ramroth (2007) p. 165; St. Louis Post-Dispatch retrospective via search excerpt | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe ; https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/years-ago-a-final-blow-is-dealt-to-pruitt-igoe/article_e2a30e7c-f180-5770-8962-bf6e8902efc1.html | WP: "Pruitt-Igoe initially cost $36 million"; Post-Dispatch excerpt (abstract used; full text not available): "federal housing appropriations paid most of the $36 million to build them". Secondary; used on a card only as "about $36 million, by one count." |
| Federal funding paid for construction; operations and maintenance were not subsidized and depended on tenants' rent | HUD-EDGE | see above | "Although federal funding supported Pruitt-Igoe's construction, the project's maintenance and operations were unsubsidized. Because Pruitt-Igoe's upkeep depended entirely on rent from the project's low-income tenants, excessive vacancies would imperil its financial and physical condition." |
| Under the 1949 Act, local authorities were expected to fund operations and maintenance from rents | BRISTOL | see above | p. 166: "Under the 1949 Housing Act, local housing authorities were expected to fund their operations and maintenance out of rents collected from tenants." |
| National program design: federal capital financing under annual contributions contracts; operations sustained mainly on rents; operating assistance first authorized in 1969, when the Brooke Amendment capped rent at 25 percent of income | CRS-2014 | see above | "The federal government would provide capital financing under long-term Annual Contributions Contracts (ACCs)." "Public housing's operations would be sustained primarily on tenant rents"; the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 "authorized HUD to begin providing operating assistance to PHAs"; "the Brooke Amendment capped tenant contributions toward rent at 25% of family income." |
| Pruitt opened to tenants in 1954; the complex was completed by 1956 | HUD-EDGE; BRISTOL; VONH; MHS | see above | HUD-EDGE: "In 1954, the first tenant moved into"; BRISTOL p. 165: "Pruitt-Igoe was completed in 1954"; VONH: "completed in 1956". WP (citing Post-Dispatch, July 23, 1955): Pruitt first tenants November 1954, Igoe July 1955. Shown as "opened 1954 to 1956" |
| Planned as two segregated parts: Pruitt for Black tenants, Igoe for white tenants | RAIN-1967; BRISTOL; TCLF; VONH | see above | RAIN-1967 p. 117: "Igoe was built for whites, Pruitt for Negroes" (1967 wording); BRISTOL p. 165: "originally conceived as two segregated sections (Pruitt for blacks and Igoe for whites)"; TCLF: "the Igoe Apartments were originally designated for European-American residents and the Pruitt Homes for African-American residents" |
| HUD's account: originally two separately located projects; when the white site fell through, segregated complexes on one plot | HUD-EDGE | see above | "Pruitt-Igoe was originally intended to be two separately located public housing projects: one for white residents and one for black residents. When the location for the white development fell through, the city planned to build segregated complexes on the same plot." |
| Desegregated in the mid-1950s; white tenants left and by the mid-1960s tenants were almost all Black | HUD-EDGE; TCLF; RAIN-1967 | see above | TCLF: "When the complex was desegregated in 1955, many European-American residents left"; HUD-EDGE: "the tenant population of Pruitt-Igoe was almost entirely black by the mid-1960s"; RAIN-1967 p. 117: "all of the whites have moved out". Which court ordered it is disputed |
| Bristol: the first tenants appeared pleased; the units were a much higher level of amenity than the homes they had left | BRISTOL | see above | p. 165: "Overall Pruitt-Igoe's first tenants appeared pleased with their new housing. Despite the relatively cheap construction quality, the units still represented a much higher level of amenity than the dilapidated units they had vacated or been forced to leave." |
| 1967 survey: the great majority of tenants felt their apartments were better than their previous homes | RAIN-1967 | see above | p. 118: "although the great majority of the tenants feel that their apartments are better than their previous dwelling units, only a minority demonstrate any real attachment to the project community" |
| A tenant, 1967: the program succeeded inside the apartment, not outside | RAIN-1967 | same | p. 118: "Inside the apartment they did, bnt [but] not outside." |
| A later survey figure: 78 percent satisfied with their apartment | WP citing Rainwater (1970) p. 11 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe | "78% of residents reported that they were satisfied with their apartment". Secondary; not used on cards |
| Landings shared by two families were clean and well kept; apartments were neat and kept "with great pride" | NEWMAN-1996 | see above | p. 11: "Where only two families shared a landing, it was clean and well-maintained. If one could get oneself invited into an apartment, one found it neat and well maintained, modestly furnished perhaps, but with great pride." (Newman's dash replaced with a comma) |
| Newman's design argument: corridors shared by 20 families and lobbies shared by 150 gave no sense of control | NEWMAN-1996 | same | p. 11: "corridors shared by 20 families, and lobbies, elevators, and stairs shared by 150 families were a disaster" |
| Newman also points to money for upkeep: middle-income high-rises fund doormen and porters; high-rise public housing barely funds daytime maintenance | NEWMAN-1996 | same | pp. 12 to 13: "Middle-income apartment buildings have funds available for doormen, porters, elevator operators, and resident superintendents ... but in highrise public housing, there are barely enough funds for 9-to-5 nonresident maintenance men" |
| Carr Square Village, older row houses across the street, stayed fully occupied | NEWMAN-1996 | same | p. 11: "Across the street from Pruitt-Igoe was an older, smaller, row-house complex, Carr Square Village ... It had remained fully occupied and trouble-free" |
| Demand for inner-city low-income housing had tapered off by 1954; suburban building opened the rental market and many chose private housing | BRISTOL (citing Montgomery 1985) | see above | pp. 165 to 166: "by the time the project opened in 1954, this demand had tapered off. Slow overall metropolitan population growth and the overproduction of inexpensive suburban dwellings helped open up the previously tight inner-city rental market to blacks. Many chose to live in inexpensive private dwellings rather than in public housing." |
| Planners assumed the project would stay full of working-class tenants | HUD-EDGE | see above | "Pruitt-Igoe's planners, Freidrichs noted, had assumed that the project would be consistently filled with working-class people seeking housing in the city." (the film director's remark, reported by HUD) |
| Occupancy peaked at 91 percent in 1957 and then declined | BRISTOL | see above | p. 166: "Pruitt-Igoe's occupancy rate peaked in 1957 at 91% and immediately began to decline." |
| Vacancy was higher than comparable St. Louis projects from the time it opened | HUD-EDGE | see above | "research demonstrated that, from the time it opened its doors, Pruitt-Igoe had a higher vacancy rate than did more successful, contemporaneous housing projects in St. Louis." |
| 1967: vacancy over 20 percent at all times for several years; 20 to 25 percent overall; 35 to 40 percent in two-bedroom apartments | RAIN-1967 | see above | p. 116: "In the last few years the project has at all times had a vacancy rate of over 20 percent." p. 117: "while the overall vacancy rate has run between 20 and 25 percent for several years, the vacancy rate in two-bedroom apartments has been in the 35-40 percent range." |
| 1967: no other public housing project in the country approached its vacancies | RAIN-1967 | same | p. 116: "no other public housing project in the country approaches it in terms of vacancies" |
| Occupancy by section: Pruitt 95 and Igoe 86 percent at peak; about 75 and 65 percent in the 1960s; 57.1 and 48.9 percent in 1969 | WP citing Meehan (1979) p. 77 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe | "Occupancy at both Pruitt and Igoe peaked in the first years, at 95% and 86% respectively. In the 1960s, Pruitt remained about 75% full and Igoe 65%. In 1969, those numbers fell to 57.1% and 48.9%." Secondary; in record notes only |
| By 1970 only 10 of 33 buildings were occupied | WP citing Meehan (1979) p. 96 | same | "Only 10 of the original 33 buildings were still occupied." Secondary; not on cards |
| Falling occupancy and rising costs squeezed the authority; maintenance was neglected | BRISTOL (citing Meehan) | see above | p. 166: "This decline in occupancy directly impacted the St. Louis Housing Authority's ability to maintain the project ... In a period of rising costs and declining occupancy, the Housing Authority was placed in a cost-income squeeze that impeded its ability to conduct basic repairs." "These demographic shifts and economic pressures resulted in chronic neglect of maintenance and mechanical breakdowns. Elevators failed to work" |
| After 1960, rents no longer covered operating costs; the authority drew reserves and cut other projects | WP citing Meehan (1979) p. 76 | same | "After 1960, the rental income from Pruitt-Igoe failed to cover the cost of operation, forcing the housing authority to tap into its reserves and causing cutbacks at other developments" Secondary |
| Minimum rent rose from $20 a month (1952) to $58 (1968) | WP citing Meehan (1979) p. 83 | same | "raised the minimum rent from $20 a month in 1952 ... to $32 in 1958 ... $43 in 1962 ... and $58 in 1968" Secondary; in record only |
| 1967: the subsidy per household was about $545 a year, one-fifth of tenants' mean family income | RAIN-1967 | see above | p. 124: "a subsidized apartment that costs about $545 a year. This amounts to one-fifth of the mean family income of the tenants in the project." |
| 1967: over half of households were headed by women and over half relied mainly on public assistance | RAIN-1967 | same | p. 117: "over half of the households are headed by women and over half derive their principle income from public assistance" |
| State welfare rules restricted support to families without a man in the home | HUD-EDGE | see above | "state welfare policies at the time restricted support to families without a man in the home, placing many residents in a difficult position." |
| The area became "something of an amenity desert," short of transportation, jobs and food | HUD-EDGE | same | Freidrichs: the area "became something of an amenity desert," lacking sufficient access to transportation, jobs, and food |
| Ground-floor businesses were cut from the design; no public mailbox | WP citing Ramroth (2007) p. 170 and Miller and Rainwater (1967) p. 4 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe | "ground-floor businesses had been eliminated from the design to save money, and the complex had no public mailbox" Secondary; in record only |
| 1967 survey: over half of a representative sample called broken glass and trash, dangerous elevators, skip-stop elevators, and mice and cockroaches "a very big problem" | RAIN-1967 | see above | pp. 117 to 118: "some of the troubles which over half of this representative sample of tenants characterized as 'a very big problem' ... A few of these problems had to do with the design and maintenance of the project: There's too much broken glass and trash around outside. The elevators are dangerous. The elevators don't stop on every floor ... There are mice and cockroaches in the buildings." |
| Hazards included exposed steam pipes and windows children fell from | RAIN-1967; BRISTOL (quoting Architectural Forum, 1965) | see above | RAIN-1967 p. 117: "children fall out of windows or into elevator shafts ... or burn themselves on exposed steam pipes" |
| Basic services such as elevators and heating often failed | WP citing Miller and Rainwater, Social Work 12, no. 4 (October 1967), pp. 7 to 8 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe | "Basic services like elevators and heating often failed, and maintenance sometimes took years to respond to tenant requests." Secondary; record only |
| 1965: first federal grants for physical repair and social programs; little effect | BRISTOL | see above | p. 166: "In 1965 the first of several federal grants arrived to provide physical rejuvenation and the establishment of social programs ... The programs had little effect" |
| More than $1 million was spent on renovation in the 1970s, mainly federal grants | WP citing Meehan (1979) p. 112 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe | "Despite the impending demolition, more than $1 million was spent on renovation in the 1970s, mainly funded by grants from the federal government." Secondary; story says only that federal renovation grants followed in the 1970s |
| Before 1972 the authority spent more than $5 million trying to fix the problems | VONH | see above | "In 1972, after spending more than $5 million in vain to cure the problems at Pruitt-Igoe, the St. Louis Housing Authority ... demolished three of the high-rise buildings." |
| 1969: tenants joined residents of two other projects in a nine-month rent strike | BRISTOL | see above | p. 166: "In 1969 Pruitt-Igoe tenants joined residents of two other St. Louis public housing projects in a massive nine-month rent strike." |
| The strike settlement: the authority's board resigned and tenant organizations gained influence | WP citing Meehan (1979) pp. 91 to 92 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe | "It ended with a settlement under which the board of commissioners of the housing authority resigned and tenant organizations were granted more influence." Secondary; in record only |
| First demolition: March 16, 1972, a test of explosives against a wrecking ball, after remaining tenants were moved to 11 buildings | BRISTOL; DEZEEN-2022; Commons file description (HUD photo) | see above; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pruitt-igoe_collapse-series.jpg | BRISTOL p. 166: "In an effort to determine whether explosion or traditional headache-ball demolition would be cheaper, all the remaining tenants were moved to 11 buildings, and on March 16, 1972 a demolition experiment levelled three buildings in the center of the project." DEZEEN-2022 (summary): the famous image shows a test demolition on 16 March 1972. Commons: "the March 16 demolition" |
| Further implosions in 1972: April 21, June 9 and July 15 | WP citing Ramroth (2007) p. 165 and Post-Dispatch, June 10, 1972 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pruitt%E2%80%93Igoe | "the first building was demolished with explosives on March 16, 1972. More buildings followed on April 21, June 9, and July 15." Commons dates the HUD photo series to April 1972. Secondary |
| HUD's own article dates the first demolition to July 15, 1972 | HUD-EDGE | see above | "On July 15, 1972, the city of St. Louis admitted defeat and demolished 3 of the project's 33 towers." Conflicts with BRISTOL |
| Charles Jencks wrote that modern architecture died "on July 15, 1972 at 3.32pm (or thereabouts)" | DEZEEN-2022; BRISTOL | see above | DEZEEN-2022 quotes Jencks: "Modern architecture died in St Louis Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3.32pm (or thereabouts)". BRISTOL p. 168: Jencks (1977) "asserted that the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe represents the death of modern architecture" |
| Jencks's own account called the blocks fourteen stories and award-winning; they were eleven stories and never won an award | BRISTOL | see above | p. 168 quotes Jencks: "it won an award from the American Institute of Architects when it was designed in 1951. It consisted of elegant slab blocks fourteen storeys high"; p. 168: "Pruitt-Igoe never won any kind of architectural prize. An earlier St. Louis housing project by the same team of architects, the John Cochran Garden Apartments, did win two architectural awards." |
| HUD decided in 1973 to demolish the rest; cleared by 1976 | BRISTOL; HUD-EDGE; EPA | see above | BRISTOL p. 166: "in 1973 H.U.D. decided to demolish the rest of the project, and finally finished it off in 1976." HUD-EDGE: "By 1976, the razing of Pruitt-Igoe was complete." |
| A local group including former residents proposed buying and renovating four buildings; HUD said no | BRISTOL (citing Comerio 1981) | see above | p. 171, note 29: "a local community redevelopment group that included former Pruitt-Igoe residents made a proposal to buy and renovate four of the buildings, but were turned down by H.U.D." |
| Yamasaki in 1952: low buildings at low density are "unquestionably more satisfactory" | BRISTOL (quoting Yamasaki, Journal of Housing 9, 1952, p. 226) | see above | p. 169: "the low building with low density is unquestionably more satisfactory than multi-story living. ...If I had no economic or social limitations, I'd solve all my problems with one-story buildings." |
| Bristol's thesis: the design was "but one, and probably the least important" of the factors | BRISTOL | see above | p. 169: "There is clearly ample evidence that architectural design was but one, and probably the least important, of several factors in the demise of the project." |
| Bristol: architects had no control over location, density, the cut amenities or the high-rise type | BRISTOL | same | p. 169: "The architects had no control over the project's isolated location, its excessive densities, the elimination of amenities, or the use of high-rise elevator buildings." |
| HUD in 2014: the film argues city decline, welfare policy, segregation and flawed planning assumptions explain the failure better than architecture | HUD-EDGE | see above | "The Pruitt-Igoe Myth argues that factors such as structural changes occurring in St. Louis, public welfare policies, racial segregation, and flawed assumptions made by the project's planners better explain what happened." |
| HUD official: many made Pruitt-Igoe "a scapegoat" | HUD-EDGE | same | Bryan Greene: "Many made Pruitt-Igoe a scapegoat, a symbol of failure, and from Pruitt-Igoe drew conclusions about the racial and social dynamics of public housing across the country." |
| EPA: design flaws and lack of maintenance funding led to vacancy and crime | EPA | see above | "design flaws and lack of funding for maintenance led to increased vacancy rates and crime, leaving the complex uninhabitable just 20 years later." |
| St. Louis city population: 816,048 (1940), 856,796 (1950), 750,026 (1960), 622,236 (1970), 453,085 (1980), 396,685 (1990) | CENSUS | see above | Tables 17 to 22, row "St. Louis city, MO": 816,048; 856,796; 750,026; 622,236; 453,085; 396,685 |
| St. Louis lost about 234,000 residents from 1950 to 1970 (27 percent); 47 percent by 1980 | CENSUS (computed); VONH | see above | 856,796 minus 622,236 = 234,560 (27.4 percent); 856,796 minus 453,085 = 403,711 (47.1 percent). VONH: "From 1950 to 1970, the city's population fell by 234,000 people, and its share of the St. Louis metropolitan area's population plummeted from 51 percent to 26 percent." |
| HUD's article says St. Louis lost half its population in the 1950s and 1960s | HUD-EDGE | see above | "St. Louis, however, experienced dramatic demographic changes during the 1950s and 1960s, losing half of its population." Conflicts with CENSUS |
| By 2014 half the site held two city schools and the other half had grown into urban forest | HUD-EDGE | see above | "Today, half of the property is occupied by two St. Louis city schools; in the other half, an overgrown urban forest has sprung up amid the rubble." |
| The site stayed vacant after 1976 and became a demolition landfill in the 1990s; later bought by a developer; a medical campus announced | EPA | see above | "Once demolished in 1976, the site remained vacant until the 1990s when it became a demolition landfill." "purchased from the city land bank by a local developer." "Ponce Health Sciences University recently announced an $80 million investment to develop a new medical campus" (2020 projection; not confirmed built) |
| Today about 33 acres remain undeveloped, with prairie grasses where lawns were | TCLF | see above | "an undeveloped 33-acre site bisected by remnants of concrete paths"; "Where broad lawns once spread between the towers, prairie grasses now grow." |
| The complexes were hailed in 1954 as an answer to blight | MHS | see above | "When completed in 1954 both complexes were hailed as an answer to blight and the housing problems in post-World War II St. Louis." |
